


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18 September 1963

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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C O N T E N T S

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6. Morocco - Communist China: A sizable quantity of Moroccan cobalt ore apparently will be sold to Communist China. (Page 6)

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7. Notes: [redacted] Brazil;
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North - South Vietnam: Hanoi has given no indication that it intends to soften its terms for a cease-fire in South Vietnam in order to exploit the present crisis.

During the past few days, propaganda from North Vietnam and from the Hanoi-controlled Communist front organization in South Vietnam has pointedly reiterated Hanoi's basic demand that all US forces be withdrawn from South Vietnam prior to the arrangement of a cease-fire. The propaganda may have been sparked by recent speculation in the West that the North Vietnamese were ready to compromise with the Diem government.

(An unconfirmed report from a French source claims that Hanoi has responded favorably to French efforts to arrange North-South talks. The North Vietnamese might be interested in contacting southern leaders to probe for softness in the Saigon Government. They may feel that the Diem regime has been weakened by the Buddhist crisis and the development of new strains in US - South Vietnamese relations.)

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USSR: (A preliminary evaluation of recently acquired information on the Soviet SA-3 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system tends to support previous estimates that it is designed to give the USSR a capability for interception of aircraft at lower altitudes than the SA-2 system.)

(The small size of the missile--20 feet long--is indicative of a limited range of 10-15 nautical miles (n. m.) as compared with the 34-foot-long SA-2 missile--with a range of 20-25 n. m. The short range, the mounting of the missile on dual launchers, and the siting of the acquisition and guidance radars all suggest a low-altitude mission for the SA-3 system.)

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DAILY BRIEF

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USSR: The Soviet regime may be preparing the population for an increase in the price of bread and other grain products.

The US Embassy has reliable information that meetings have been held recently in plants and apartment houses to hear a note from the party central committee describing difficulties with the harvest. The note is said to indicate that because of poor harvest prospects, grain collections are likely to reach only 75 percent of the plan. It also said that the regime was making efforts to buy extra grain abroad.

Soviet citizens are apparently interpreting the note as a move to soften up consumers for price rises of bread and bread products. About half of the diet is made up of grain products which have long been available at low prices.

If the regime intends to raise prices, its cautious approach suggests it is apprehensive that such a move might touch off localized civil disturbances similar to those which followed price hikes for meat and butter in June 1962.

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Morocco - Communist China: (Morocco evidently is about to sell Communist China 4,000 tons of cobalt ore.)

(Representatives of the Moroccan producer and the Chinese Embassy in Rabat reportedly were prepared to sign an agreement yesterday to provide the ore somewhat above the world market price. Communist China bought a similar amount from Morocco in 1960.)

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[redacted] (This year Moroccan stocks of cobalt ore, which is in short supply in the Sino-Soviet bloc, have been considerably above what is needed to supply its normal Western European outlets. Morocco's interest in the sale is also heightened by its high trade deficit with Communist China.) [redacted]

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NOTES

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Brazil: (The Brazilian Government hopes to convene a "Congress of Underdeveloped Nations" in Brazil some time next year,

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As a preliminary move, the Brazilians plan to spend the next few weeks sounding out the attitudes of other Latin American countries. If the response is favorable, they intend to issue formal invitations to those countries as well as to those of Africa and Asia.)

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*Indonesia-UK-Malaysia: Economic sanctions are apparently being taken against some British firms in Indonesia in reprisal for the UK role in the formation of Malaysia. The British ambassador in Djakarta has protested the actions of several Indonesian employee groups who notified British firms yesterday that they were taking over. Meanwhile the Malaysian Government severed diplomatic relations with Indonesia and the Philippines on 17 September.

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DAILY BRIEF

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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